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Abstract
While scholarship on the politics of labor market divides and labor law in Latin America
has bloomed in recent years, this literature rarely looks at the role of public opinion.
Using data on public attitudes towards labor law for 18 Latin American countries, we
start filling this gap. We follow the literature on labor market divides to see how far
those at the margins of the formal labor market differ in their opinions from the formally
employed. We find that large segments of the people perceive labor law as protective for
workers, but there are also important divides: Whereas formal sector workers indeed
assess the protective function of labor law positively, informal sector workers are more
sceptical. Moreover, we find feedback effects of labor law on these differences of
opinion. We conclude with a discussion how these divides in attitudes also have political
effects, especially on voting behavior.
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Introduction
The last decade has seen a resurgence in scholarly debates about the politics of labor
market divides (Murillo and Schrank, 2005; Rueda et al., 2015). In Latin America,
these debates have often focused on informality (Carnes and Mares, 2014, 2015, Berens
2015a, 2015b), in turn building on older work on the informal sector (Hart, 1973; Perry
et al., 2007; Portes and Hoffman, 2003; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). Yet divides and
insidership are mainly discussed in terms of social exclusion rather than labor market
exclusion. Somewhat surprisingly, for both the European and nascent Latin American
debates, the role of labor law is an area less covered. When we say surprising we mean
that in many theories labor law acts as the linchpin for much of the differentiation into
insider-biased or dualised labor markets (Saint-Paul, 2000; Kemmerling, 2009). Labor
law defines the individual and collective rules and regulations that aim at protecting or
representing workers’ rights in firm relationships. Yet, especially in empirical research
on the micro level, the role of regulation falls behind when compared to issues of
redistribution and risk exposure (Rehm, 2009).
When it comes to studying the politics of labor regulation, most approaches are macro
in nature. For Latin America, there is a lot of literature on the linkages between political
parties, unions, and labor regulation (Collier and Collier, 2002). Matthew Carnes has
developed a fascinating account about the historical origins of labor law (e.g. Carnes,
2014b). Others, such as Maria Victoria Murillo or Layna Mosley, have sharpened our
understanding of recent reforms of labor codes (Mosley and Uno, 2007; Murillo, 2005;
Murillo and Schrank, 2005). While our knowledge of the origins and reforms in labor
laws in Latin America has improved, we know much less about their political conse-
quences, especially on the level of voters and public opinion. What does the public think
about these laws, who really benefits or loses, and who supports or vetoes reforms of
labor markets in Latin America?
Resistance against labor reforms is clearly high, despite the bout of the liberalising
economic reforms in many other areas during the 1990s. And we see remarkable variation
in the extent and configuration of these laws throughout the region and that many countries
avoided the liberal reform pressure in the domain of labor market regulations (Murillo,
2005). This calls for a closer inspection of what people think of these labor codes.
We will look at public opinion on labor laws in Latin America to find out who are
potential beneficiaries or losers. While the idea of labor laws is to give protection to
employed people, huge problems of legal coverage and informality in Latin America
make us believe that certain types of labor laws only work for parts of the population.
The unemployed or informal sector workers, in particular, might think of labor laws
differently. Moreover, this divide itself could depend on existing levels and types of
regulation. Finally, some individuals may have found means to protect themselves
against labor market risks in other ways so that they depend less on the role of insti-
tutions: class, education, or political connections may function as substitutes or
complements to coverage in the legal system. For all these reasons, different
employment groups may differ in how they see labor regulation, and even how they
react politically to it.
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To show this, we look at public attitudes towards job laws and whether or when
people perceive them as protection for workers. We sharpen our expectations by sur-
veying the literature on labor regulation in Latin America (“Labor Market Divides,
Informality, and the Demand for Regulation” section). Next, we use Latinobarometer
(LAB) data for up to eighteen countries and run a battery of multi-level regressions to
understand the determinants of public opinion (“Empirical Determinants for Public
Opinion on Labor Laws” section). On the micro level, we find that individuals at the
fringe of the formal labor market (unemployed and informal workers) think laws are less
protective (“Results” section). On the macro level, we show that feedback effects play a
role: labor law shapes the divide in public opinion, since the divide increases in countries
with better (effective) protection. We perform several robustness checks to see whether
the results remain stable in different models (“Sensitivity Analysis: Varieties of Labor
Law and Robustness” section). Finally, we discuss the larger political implications of our
findings, making a stylised example about labor market divides and voter turnout
(“Discussion and Conclusions” section).
Labor Market Divides, Informality, and the Demand for
Regulation
Up until recently, Latin American labor markets saw nearly two decades of buoyancy,
thanks to rising global demand (World Bank, 2013). So strong had the effects been they
even left their mark on (reducing levels of) inequality (Lustig et al., 2013) and arguably
facilitated much of politically delicate social and labor reforms in this period. Yet, not
everyone profited from this growth to the same degree, and not every country to the same
extent. While much of these differences are due to socio-economic factors beyond the
narrow reach of politics, the institutional setup of Latin American labor markets remains
a controversial political topic across the region.
Labor laws can entail many different aspects of regulating the work life of people. A
first important aspect, especially for most economists, is matters of hiring and firing. A
second type of laws regulates wages, working hours, and working conditions directly.
Both aspects are sometimes summarised as “individual labor laws” affecting the working
conditions of employees individually. Another aspect of labor law covers workers’ rights
to collectively organise and bargain on wages and working conditions. The literature on
corporatism and wage bargaining institutions has shown that not all these types of labor
regulation move in close correspondence and that different countries put different
degrees of importance on different aspects of the law (Boeri, 2011; Carnes, 2014a).
We know that Latin American countries diverge markedly in these forms of labor
laws. The reasons for these different trajectories have been extensively researched for
advanced and Latin American economies. There are those who put emphasis on legal
traditions (Botero et al., 2004), or the role of left political parties and unions (Collier and
Collier, 2002), or those highlighting institutional complementarities and skill needs
(Carnes, 2014a; Schneider and Karcher, 2010). For more recent reforms, Murillo (2005)
has shown how left parties have pushed for better protection even against the tides of
globalisation and structural adjustment (also Mosley and Uno, 2007; Murillo and
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Schrank, 2005), whereas conservative or non-democratic governments have aimed at
deregulating labor law (Collier and Collier, 2002;Geddes, 1994). Most of these
approaches work on the macro level of institutions or the meso level of parties and
interest groups. Naturally, such accounts give voters and the public opinion less pro-
minence. And yet, given the broad resistance against seemingly ineffective laws in
countries with huge gaps in legal coverage, public opinion on labor laws is an interesting
dimension to be explored.
In this respect, the literature on demands for regulation and redistribution, and theories
of labor market divides in particular, may be better suited to tease out the contribution of
the individual level to the politics of labor law. After all, labor laws are the linchpin of
regulation that may drive visible wedges between those with standardised work contracts
and those without. Implicitly or explicitly labor regulation is the focal area of the literature
on labor market dualisation (Boeri, 2011; Emmenegger et al., 2012). It also relates closely
to the idea of labor market insiders and outsiders (Rueda, 2005; Saint-Paul, 2000).
However, these theories have not remained uncontested. Some people have criticised them
since the divide between insiders and outsiders is not always so clear (Emmenegger, 2009).
Others have argued that, for richer countries, left parties and trade unions do not really act
exclusively in the interests of their core workers (Huo et al., 2008).
Perhaps more remarkably, the literature on labor market divides turned more directly
to questions of redistribution and insurance rather than of regulation (but see Marx,
2014). On the empirical level, much of the discussion concentrates on the insider–out-
sider divide in preferences for redistribution and spending.1 One of the reasons for this
turn is that good internationally comparable data on preferences of labor market pro-
tection are hard to come by. This is particularly true for Latin American countries.
The main labor market divide in this context is usually formal versus informal work.
This divide is extensively studied in Latin America (Perry et al., 2007; Portes and
Hoffman, 2003; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). More recently, scholars have used this
divide to explain policies of redistribution and insurance, such as the recent move
towards tax-financed minimal pensions (Carnes and Mares, 2013), or to analyse attitudes
towards public versus private healthcare and pension provision (Berens, 2015a). One
puzzling finding from this literature is, however, the “non-divide” on these issues
(Berens, 2015b; Baker and Velasco-Guachalla, 2018). And yet, since jobs have a much
larger meaning in people’s lives than just the instrumental value of generating income, it
is worth looking at how people position themselves on the regulative questions about
labor and how far the actual divide is about labor law rather than social policy. For this,
we need to go one step back and ask the primordial questions: what does the public think
about labor laws and can we find traces of conflicts of interests and interpretation
between those who benefit and those who do not?
These questions are difficult to answer. A first, pertinent problem is data quality.
Questions about labor law are rarely asked in general surveys and wording issues are
considerable (see below). More importantly, labor laws face huge implementation
problems in Latin America (Mosley and Uno, 2007; Ronconi, 2015). Indeed, the
enforcement of labor laws is itself a political problem (Feierherd, 2017; Holland, 2016),
a factor which can divide labor markets even further. In this sense, the problem of
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implementation rather reinforces the logic of labor market divides. The fact that orga-
nisations such as trade unions successfully mobilise against the deregulation of labor
markets in many Latin American countries is just one empirical piece of evidence that
political actors take these laws seriously despite issues of implementation.
A second reason why the effects of labor laws on public attitudes may be complex is
that the laws do not affect everyone in the same way. Different income groups, education
levels, or occupations and sectors will be differently governed by these laws. These
insights are consistent with the literature on insidership and labor market divides. In the
strong notion of insidership, labor law might mean excluding others, a barrier to entry, so
that labor law is not only about protection but also exclusion. This strong notion has been
criticised in the literature, since it depends on several crucial assumptions. Does labor
law really create strong barriers? And if it does, do outsiders really oppose these barriers
and would rather prefer no regulation? A weaker notion of insidership is based on the
idea of asymmetric divides, in which certain types of regulations are more beneficial to
some type of workers than others (Kemmerling, 2009). Finding traces of a conflict of
interest is therefore not as straightforward as it seems on first sight.
Thirdly, defining insiders is not trivial, since job protection can come in many forms:
some employees have stronger market power (especially those in buoyant economic
sectors or those who are hard to replace), or have better political contacts to receive
political protection (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Outsiders are usually defined as those
vulnerable segments in the labor market which are not covered by regulation and which
therefore also benefit less directly from it. These segments may consist of the unem-
ployed, temporarily employed, or those working in the informal sector and who are ipso
facto not under the coverage of formal regulation. As argued above the boundaries
between formally employed and the informal and unemployed may be blurred in some
instances so that it becomes an empirical question how strong such divides really are. For
these reasons, we formulate as a first hypothesis:
H1: Public opinion on labor law should be divided: whereas formally employed
workers should perceive it to be beneficial, the informal and unemployed should
be more sceptical about its consequences.
An interesting further complication arises if there are policy feedbacks from exist-
ing laws to public opinion. Feedback effects work through individual experiences in
the labor market when some people have more difficulties to find a job or to keep a
job than others due to existing levels of regulation. Such policy feedbacks have been
found in numerous cases (e.g. Gingrich and Ansell, 2012). One literature in which
such feedback effects feature prominently is how existing institutions affect public
perceptions of labor market vulnerability. Interestingly, this literature is somewhat
divided. On the one hand, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) find that tougher employ-
ment protection legislation does reduce what they call cognitive job insecurity in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. This
would imply a positive feedback effect from existing institutions to the effectiveness
and support of these institutions. Others, however, have found the opposite to be true
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(Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009), which would imply a negative feedback effect.
Kemmerling (2016) also finds patterns which are more consistent with the latter view,
but more so for an effect on the divide itself, that is, different segments in the labor
market diverge more strongly in a country where job protection is tougher.
H2: There may be policy feedback effects between existing institutions of labor
regulation and public opinion. Differences between people in the core and the
fringes of the labor market will be stronger in those countries, where labor regu-
lation is tougher.
Empirical Determinants for Public Opinion on Labor Laws
To investigate the public perception of labor laws, we make use of the standardised public
opinion survey LAB. The LAB contains a relevant item about the public perception of
labor law for the years 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2005. Since only the LAB 2005 has all items
needed to specify our estimation model, we use this for our main analysis, but calculate
robustness texts for previous years (available on request).2 Observations at the individual
level are clustered in countries so that standard errors could be biased downward (Gelman
and Hill, 2007; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Our analytical interest also gears special
interest towards the existing levels of labor regulations at the macro level. For these
reasons, we apply a linear hierarchical regression model and allow the intercept to vary.3
We start the analysis of microlevel components before we subsequently add cross-level
interaction terms between employment status and an indicator of labor regulation.
Dependent Variable: Labor Law Scepticism
Our dependent variable is a survey item (p86st) that asks the respondent how far he or
she thinks that workers are protected by labor law.4 Four possible answer categories are
provided: (1) “very protected,” (2) “fairly protected,” (3) “a little protected,” or (4) “not
at all protected.” Higher values, thus, indicate a dissatisfaction with or a scepticism about
labor laws.
This variable is in some sense sociotropic and therefore particularly interesting for our
purposes: it loads the dices against finding clear individual-level differences between
insiders and outsiders. For instance, different types of workers respond to the question
differently depending on how they perceive their own situation and which type of workers
they associate “trabajadores” with.5 Only if informal workers judge the protective function
of labor law for formal workers differently than formal workers evaluate these laws for
themselves, we would run into a possible bias. Otherwise we will underestimate the effect,
since informal workers will then see the protective function of the law when thinking about
formals in ways similar to the way formal sector workers view these laws.
In addition, the item is very close to the original literature on insidership which focuses
precisely on the type of (blue-collar) workers for which employment regulation was
originally developed. What the item does, however, is to introduce a sociotropic element
into the analysis, since people are asked about their belief in the capacity of laws to protect
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(other) workers.6 Indeed, we can see this sociotropic element by looking at standard
egotropic measures such as one’s own subjective perception of job security (p85st): how
far the respondent worries to be left without work in the next 12 months. For 2005, the
dependent variable (DV) and this type of subjective unemployment risk are only weakly
correlated with r ¼ 0.103. A crucial advantage of our DV is that it is asked to the whole
population and not only those (formally) employed. Hence, our variable not only measures
something more than only the subjective assessment of one’s own situation but also asks
people about their assessment about the general capacity of labor law to protect workers.7
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the DV for each country, highlighting both the
cross-country and within-country variation. We treat the item as a continuous variable,
since a linear model specification comes with lower statistical complexity and demands
on the data structure compared to a hierarchical ordered probit regression. However,
given the peak around the third category, we also run a robustness test with a dichot-
omised (1 ¼ labor law scepticism) variable.8
Employment Status
In the scholarly literature, the main forms of labor market divides are related to
employment status. The LAB contains information whether the respondent is currently
“self-employed,” a “salaried employee in a public company,” a “salaried employee in a
private company,” “temporarily out of work,” “retired,” “responsible for shopping and
house work,” or a “student” (LAB 2005, s13a).9 To study the effect of employment
status, we use workers who are employed in the private sector as reference category in
the estimation models below. Private employees are a rather well-defined category and
are the main ‘protagonists’ in theories of labor market divides.
We are particularly interested in the group of informal workers as labor market
outsiders, for which we create a dummy variable.10 Identifying informal workers is
particularly challenging as informality comes with an extra-legal status (Perry et al.,
2007) so that respondents are less inclined to reveal belonging to this sector. Drawing
upon Loayza and Rigolini who claim that “in most countries there is a strong association
between self-employment and informal activity, as most self-employed workers tend to
be low-skilled and unregistered workers” (2011: 1508), we use the employment category
“self-employment” as first indicator for informal labor (see also Hart, 1973; Schneider
and Enste, 2000). Similar to Berens (2015b), we only deem those self-employed
respondents as informal who also indicate to lack health insurance (item s16). Those
who respond to have public health insurance are coded as formal self-employed.11 While
this operationalisation is not without criticisms, it is a robust proxy for a critical chunk of
individuals working in informality and frequently used in empirical analyses.
Labor Law
Independent of the individual’s socio-economic outlook and individual characteristics
we assume labor law to exert an impact on labor law scepticism. Given the recent work
on non-enforcement and implementation (Feierherd, 2017; Holland, 2016; Ronconi,
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2015), we mainly rely on a de facto measure of employment law using Mosley’s 2010
labor rights (LRs thereafter) indicator.12 LR focuses on collective LRs that provide
workers with the right to mobilise and to collective bargaining. It is based on the following
information: “freedom of association and collective bargaining, related liberties, the right
to establish and join worker and union organisations, other union activities, the right to
bargain collectively, the right to strike, and rights in export processing zones” (Mosley,
2010). The index is based on information about violations of these rights for the
period from 1985 to 2002 for a large set of developed and developing countries.
Higher values mean “better collective labor rights.” The measure is, thus, not (only)
an assessment of de jure but (also) de facto rights, as the implementation of the law
is considered as well.13 The average value is 18 (standard deviation of 4.2) for the
Latin American sample. The last available year is 2002 which we use in the analysis
of the LAB 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the country’s performance
on collective LRs together with our DV scepticism about labor law for the available
LAB survey information. It shows that on the aggregate level, there is a weak trend:
countries with stronger laws have a more benign public attitude towards these laws.
Control Variables
Public opinion on labor laws may depend on many more determinants than employment
status. We therefore introduce a set of micro- and macro-level factors that are relevant
for the individual’s perception of job protection of workers. Lower income earners
should be more sensitive to job protection. Since the LAB lacks information on the
respondent’s income, we make instead use of asset information and compile an objective
Figure 2. LRs Index (Mosley, 2010) and Scepticism about Labor Law (LAB 1997, 2000, 2001, 2005).
LR: labor right; LAB: Latinobarometer.
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indicator of wealth quintiles using multiple correspondence analysis (see Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001).14 We add information on gender (male equals 1), head of household,
marital status, education, and age. For educational attainment, we group the individual’s
response on schooling into three categories: primary (illiterate, incomplete primary, com-
plete primary) as reference category, secondary (incomplete and complete secondary),
and tertiary education (incomplete higher and complete higher education). As indi-
viduals who are not the head of the household could be less sensitive to job protection
issues due to intra-household redistribution (Ha¨usermann et al., 2016), we add dummy
variables for household head and marital status. Moreover, we factor in if the respondent
lives in a rather rural or urban area (1¼ rural to 8¼ living in a capital city) since access to
protection and stability of employment might vary between the center and the periphery.
Additionally, we add a batch of political control variables. First, a respondent’s
ideological affiliation to a party on the left or right scale might influence how they
think about labor laws. We use the ideological self-placement of the respondent (1¼ right
to 10 ¼ left). Second, we think that people sympathetic to unions should agree more with
the statement, especially when labor unions have close ties to the government (Collier and
Collier, 2002; Murillo, 2005).15 The correlation between union members and respondents
who have high confidence in trade unions should be high. As with all attitudinal items,
there may be causality issues. For this reason, we add these only at a later stage.16 Third,
drawing upon Holland (2016) and Feierherd (2017), laws might be in place without being
enforced so that individuals only respond to labor law when it is really enacted. We use an
item on the respondent’s perception on the state’s ability to “enforce laws,” measured on a
scale from 1 ¼ “unable to enforce any” to 10 ¼ “able to enforce all.”
Moreover, we take political or, possibly even clientelist, linkages at the micro level into
account. Respondents report the frequency of contacts with public officials, the local
government, officials at higher level, and elected legislative representatives in the LAB.17
Drawing upon the vast literature on clientelism in Latin America, such contacts can be read
as indicators of clientelistic relationships (Auyero, 1999). Booth and Seligson (2009),
among others, have argued that the contact with politicians could imply several logics such
as voicing criticism or support, but they agree that those seeking a clientelistic bargain are
the ones most likely to make contact. We use an additive indicator of political activism,
higher values reflecting stronger political ties.18 If political ties may yield informal forms
of employment insurance, they may relate to concerns about labor law.
Finally, at the macro level, we control for social policy supply. A generous welfare
state based on universal social policy programs should reduce labor insecurity con-
cerns as unemployment insurance can compensate income loss in economic hard times
(see Carnes and Mares, 2015; Huber and Stephens, 2012). In contrast, a less generous
welfare state often treats the formal sector with stable employment histories pre-
ferentially and places individuals who do not match these high standards at extreme
risk of poverty in times of job loss. We use social security expenditures as share of
GDP (CEPAL 2016) as measure for the welfare state. As free parameters at the macro
level are limited (see the discussion of Stegmueller, 2013), we restrict the number of
macro-level controls to a minimum and add macro-level variables only one at a time.19
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1A of Appendix 1.
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Results
Table 1 presents the results for the micro-level variables of interest: employment status
and informality. As expected, we find that unemployed workers are more sceptic about
labor laws compared to private employees, and so are the self-employed. These findings
are robust to different specifications of the model, so that H1 finds some empirical
support. In terms of effect size, the unemployed are the ones who express strongest
concerns about labor law. That public employees hold a positive view on the protective
function of labor law, as indicated by a negative coefficient in M1, is not surprising, but
the effect is not significant. When we switch to M2, we see the strength of the labor
market divide between formal and informal workers. Informal workers are more sceptic
about labor law compared to the formally employed, though the size of the effect is
smaller than for the unemployed. The coefficient is significant and robust to adding
controls such as the individual’s perception of his or her unemployment risk (M5 and
M6). Finally, also respondents who indicate to take care of housework are more sceptical
about labor law. Women who take care of their children and consider themselves as
homemakers often also produce handwork which would count as informal labor (Perry
et al., 2007), so that this category is likely to contain informal workers as well. We
therefore take this finding as further support for the dividing capacity of labor law
regarding labor market insiders and outsiders.
Some control variables deserve further notice. Women and older people perceive the
labor law to be less protective. In contrast, higher earnings and a better educational
background strongly diminish this concern. People living in cities are more sceptical
about the effects of labor laws. When we look at the magnitude of the coefficients,
sympathising with unions entails the strongest impact. Having confidence in trade unions
decreases scepticism by 0.140 and is significant at the 0.1 per cent level. Compared to
this, the effects of political ties are smaller, but still significant: M4 illustrates how
greater engagement with public officials and office holders goes in line with greater
confidence in job protection through current labor law. However, if this is a sign of
clientelism or rather illustrates individuals who are particularly active in voicing criti-
cism cannot be fully resolved with our measure.
While we have seen that labor market divides (unemployment and informality in
particular) do shape people’s perception of labor law, we are also interested in the
feedback effects of laws on people’s attitudes to labor regulation (H2). Hence, we now
turn to such feedback effects. Table 2 reports estimation results adding the strength of
labor law (LR). Better collective LRs decrease the average individual’s scepticism about
labor laws (M7). Labor codes that allow workers to organise, to form unions, and col-
lectively bargain tariffs and wages lead more people to believe in their usefulness for
workers. The finding is very intuitive. However, when we look at cross-level interaction
terms between the different types of employment status and LR, we find that the effect
does not hold across the range of labor market participants. While we see no significant
effect on public employees or non-employed such as the retired or students, we find a
positive and significant effect for the unemployed. Better LRs that strengthen the
position of employees against the enduring vagaries of markets make the unemployed
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Table 2. Cross-Level Interactions: Employment Status and Labor Law.
M7 M8 M9
(DV: labor law scepticism)
Employment status
Self-employed (Ref: private
employee)
0.052** (0.018) 0.036 (0.074)
Public employee 0.006 (0.026) 0.012 (0.107)
Unemployed 0.138*** (0.028) 0.406*** (0.108)
Retired 0.005 (0.032) 0.056 (0.109)
Homemaker 0.063** (0.023) 0.077 (0.086)
Student 0.042 (0.028) 0.122 (0.110)
Informal 0.203* (0.094)
LRs indicator 0.014* (0.007) 0.017* (0.007) 0.015* (0.007)
Cross-level interactions
Self-employed  LR 0.001 (0.004)
Public employee  LR 0.000 (0.006)
Unemployed  LR 0.030*** (0.006)
Retired  LR 0.003 (0.005)
Homemaker  LR 0.001 (0.005)
Student  LR 0.005 (0.006)
Informal worker  LR 0.015** (0.005)
Controls
Male 0.014 (0.014) 0.015 (0.014) 0.017 (0.014)
Age 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000)
Education
Secondary (Ref: primary) 0.029þ (0.015) 0.030* (0.015) 0.024 (0.015)
Tertiary 0.054** (0.021) 0.056** (0.021) 0.048* (0.021)
Married 0.002 (0.013) 0.003 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Wealth index 0.049*** (0.008) 0.048*** (0.008) 0.047*** (0.008)
Urban 0.017*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003)
Household head 0.003 (0.016) 0.004 (0.016) 0.024 (0.015)
Enforcement 0.063*** (0.003) 0.063*** (0.003) 0.064*** (0.003)
Union confidence 0.139*** (0.014) 0.139*** (0.014) 0.140*** (0.014)
Left ideology 0.010*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002)
Politically active 0.011* (0.005) 0.011* (0.005) 0.014** (0.005)
Macro controls
Social security exp. 0.013* (0.006) 0.013* (0.006) 0.012* (0.006)
Constant 3.712*** (0.126) 3.754*** (0.136) 3.758*** (0.128)
Random-effects parameters
Var (Constant) 0.013 (0.004) 0.013 (0.004) 0.013 (0.005)
Var (Residual) 0.514 (0.006) 0.512 (0.006) 0.512 (0.006)
N level 1 13,972 13,972 13,239
(continued)
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express greater scepticism about its usefulness for workers (see M8). Studying the
impact on informal wage earners, which is a similarly sensitive group, depicts the same
pattern (see M9). Increased LRs could, thus, be a source of labor market divides. Labor
codes which strengthen organised labor seem to make informals and unemployed more
concerned about lack of job protection through law. They could lead to a polarisation
between different segments. Figure 3 summarises the two average marginal effects for
becoming unemployed and working in the informal sector at different levels of the
strength of collective LRs on scepticism about labor law.20
Sensitivity Analysis: Varieties of Labor Law and Robustness
While we find that the average effect of labor law on the public attitudes is negative (see
model M7), that is, stronger laws reduce scepticism, it may also be that not all types of
labor laws work in the same direction (see Carnes, 2014a). Those labor laws which make
it more difficult to hire and fire people on an individual basis are sometimes assumed to
have a negative macroeconomic impact on the economy, and the informal sector is then
frequently used as buffer zone in periods when formal sector jobs fall short (Perry et al.,
2007). Knowing that it will be difficult to enter the formal sector again after one had to
leave decreases the attractiveness of such an “insurance” mechanism and thus should
increase concerns about the protective function of labor law. Hence, it might be that not
all aspects of labor law are equally important when looking for feedback effects.
The job security index (JS hereafter) of Heckman and Page´s (2000) provides infor-
mation on labor regulations which affect job security of employees individually. The
index is based on information on advance notice periods, dismissal costs, and severance
pay (2000: 27) for the late 1990s and early 2000s (on a range of 1–5, with higher values
representing stricter protection). In contrast to the LR indicator, this measure is based on
de jure information, which reduces the comparability with the LR indicator and intro-
duces more questions about implementation.21 In a simple bivariate plot, the scepticism
about labor laws increases with the JS across countries (see Figure 4). A more regulated
Table 2. (continued)
M7 M8 M9
N level 2 18 18 18
w2 924.543 962.167 860.780
ll 15198.782 15181.060 14381.871
BIC 30617.1 30638.9 28944.1
Source: LAB 2005; Mosley (2010); World Bank (WDI).
Note: LAB: Latinobarometer; LR: Labor Rights Indicator of Mosley (2010), higher values indicate more
protective collective rights. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
þp< 0.10.
*p< 0.05.
**p< 0.01.
***p<0.001.
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of (a) Unemployed and (b) Informal Workers on Labor Law
Scepticism (M6–M7) at Different Levels of LR.
LR: labor right.
Figure 4. Job Security Index (Heckman and Page´s, 2000) and Scepticism about Labor Law (LAB)
for 2005.
LAB: Latinobarometer.
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labor market in terms of stricter hiring and firing rules increases the perception that
workers are not protected, which would constitute a negative feedback effect based on
barriers to entry to the market.22 Due to the lack of macro-level data on different types of
labor laws for a larger set of countries and a larger period of time, a more thorough
analysis of the effects of the labor law variety is however, unfortunately, limited.
Another source of concern for our findings might be that they are driven by non-
randomness of the macro data. Bootstrapping resamples the original sample, and thus
artificially takes the observed sample as population. We do this to account for the fact
that the macro-level observations are few and specific countries might pose a large
influence on the findings.23 We use the cluster function to indicate the sampling structure
of individuals within countries with 1,000 repetitions. The effect for the LR indicator
remains robust with a coefficient of 0.014 and a bootstrapped standard error of 0.007
(estimation table not displayed). Also, the finding for the interaction term between LR
and unemployment and informality remains robust (M8 and M9 in Table 2).
A third potential issue is that we have treated the dependent variable as metric.
Therefore, we apply a logistic model for a simplified dummy variable (see above). Table
3 presents logistic coefficients for the model specification that are most interesting for
our analytical goal. The finding for LR is robust with the maximum likelihood speci-
fication of the model (M10 and M11). The effects of the interaction terms also remain
stable (M12 and M13).
Discussion and Conclusions
The results of the empirical analysis have revealed three aspects of the politics of labor
regulation. First, there are clear cross-country differences in the general perception of
labor laws. Second, there are clear differences between employment groups, with the
unemployed and those working in the informal sector seeing employment laws differ-
ently from the rest of the labor force. Third, there is some indication that the two levels
interact with each other in the form of feedback effects from existing labor laws to public
perception.
Our study has clear limitations. Our data on perceived vulnerability were stopped in
2005 and do not cover the recent downturn in Latin American labor markets. The
operationalisation of labor market divides is naturally limited due to data restrictions.
Moreover, some critics may be concerned about the “subjective” nature of the dependent
variable. The study of political consequences of insider–outsider dynamics is still in its
infancy, especially for Latin America and better (survey or experimental) data will yield
stronger conclusions in future research. Nonetheless, we think that our findings show
important aspects of an increasingly relevant research agenda. While labor laws are
clearly aiming at protecting workers against the vagaries of capitalism, it is not always
guaranteed that all types of laws fulfill this property for all types of people.
Hence, we believe that our findings are not only interesting for understanding the
politics of labor market reforms in Latin America but also for the general literature on the
politics of labor divides in other regions. According to the literature, findings about labor
market divides also will have implications for political behavior. For instance, Lindvall
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and Rueda (2014) have linked the politics of insidership–outsidership to its electoral
consequences. They find that Swedish Social Democrats swing between policies
favouring insiders and outsiders to differing degrees and that their electoral support
traces these changes. In more general terms, the literature on new labor market divides
has shown how these divides affect and sometimes even repress traditional forms of
political contestation.
Holland (2016) and Feierherd (2017) reveal for the Latin American context that
especially left parties benefit from varying the degree of labor law enforcement to
reach out to both insiders and outsiders. This could explain why labor market seg-
mentation does not seem to polarise on questions of social policy (Carnes and Mares,
2014, 2015; Berens, 2015a, 2015b) nor to other clearly distinguishable voting patterns
(Baker and Velasco-Guachalla, 2018). Would this also be true for the dividing line
along the protective function of labor law? We would think that dissatisfaction with
labor law is what might stimulate dualisation and, thus, more complex electoral
responses.
Just to illustrate this argument, one might think that our item on the public opinion on
labor law is related to electoral participation. We would expect labor market divides on
labor law in less developed countries to have consequences for vote abstention and vote
choice. Of course, discontent with labor market polices could drive workers to the polls
(see Agarwala, 2008), but it might also alienate them. Moreover, if labor laws “function
to divide, rather than unite, workers” (Carnes, 2014a: 1), we might see this polarisation
being translated into differing degrees of political activism.
Taking a quick glance at aggregated correlations between labor law scepticism and
abstention (¼0) versus voting (¼1) as hypothetical scenario supports our intuition that
labor market segmentation is manifested in labor law in Latin America. Respondents
who have a high level of labor law scepticism seem to be less willing to cast a vote in
elections. The pattern is particularly discernible in Brazil, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
Clearly, this is only a snapshot and causality issues loom large into our interpretation
of Figure 5. We would need further confirmation from a thorough regression analysis
over time and a large set of countries (see Singer, 2016 for insights on economic voting
among informal workers). And yet, the results indicate that concerns about the protective
function of labor law may have substantive, political effects. When voters feel the dif-
ferential effects of labor regulation, polarisation might affect many forms of political
behavior: from electoral participation to partisan vote.
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Notes
1. For example, both David Rueda (2005) and some of his critics (Emmenegger, 2009) use
proxies for people’s attitudes towards labor law. Yet, for specific countries such as France,
Guillaud and Marx (2014) have shown that people’s attitudes to labor law do not necessarily
follow the logic of monetary redistribution.
2. The following countries are included in the analysis below: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela; approximately 1,200
respondents per country.
3. Estimating the Null model, we compute an intra-class correlation of 0.076 (Gelman and Hill,
2007). Hence, 7.6 per cent of the total variation in labor law scepticism can be explained by
country-level variation.
4. LAB question wording in English (though falsely translated from Spanish): “How much
protected do you feel [under] the labor law in (country)?” The Spanish version clearly refers
to the perception of worker protection and not one’s own feeling of protection: “¿Cua´n
protegido por la ley laboral cree Ud. que se sienten en (paı´s) los trabajadores?”
5. However, “trabajadores” usually refer to low to medium skill workers, so it is less likely that
associations really differ largely between respondents.
6. One could argue that labor law scepticism is only a proxy for discontent with the government
or the economy at large, but controlling for other such sociotropic variables does not alter our
results (see Supplemental Tables S3 and S4).
7. To further tease out the sociotropic versus egotropic dimension, we control for unem-
ployment risk in M5 and M6 below and we show a model using unemployment risk as
dependent variable in the supplement file. Both variables are, however, conceptually very
distinct and have different sample sizes, so that we are not surprised to see weak effects
for the egotropic item.
8. See the logit analysis in Table 3. Results for ordered probit models are in the supplementary material.
9. Individuals who refuse to answer are coded as missing.
10. There is a huge debate about the question whether labor market divides are dichotomous or
should be thought of as gradual (e.g. Ha¨usermann et al. (forthcoming)). However, given our
data we cannot develop more fine-grained measures.
11. We exclude self-employed with private insurance because these could be both formal or
informal sector workers, even though the latter are less likely when considering the structure
of private health insurance in Latin America (Perry et al., 2007).
12. In the next section, we will show results for a different operationalisation of labor law (Heck-
man and Page´s, 2000).
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13. The measure should, however, not be conflated with the strength of unions in the respective
country. In cases such as Uruguay, collective labor law is rather weak, but unions are strong.
14. The following list of goods are queried: TV, refrigerator/icebox/freezer, own home, computer,
washing machine, telephone, mobile phone, car, holiday home, drinking water, hot water, and
a sewage system.
15. The LAB asks how far the individual confides in trade unions (p42stc) on a range from 1 ¼
“no confidence” to 4¼ “a lot” that we dichotomise into “no confidence/little” (0) and “some/a
lot” (1). We also tried the more conventional measure of union membership, but found little
differences for the main results. Remarkably though, the measure of union confidence and
membership show only a weak bivariate relationship.
16. We display a baseline model in Table 1 (M1 and M2) before we add the attitudinal variables.
The Bayesian Information Criterion value decreases in M3 which supports the superior model
fit when the variable is added.
17. They are asked: “In the past three years, for you or your family, in order to solve problems that
affect you in your neighborhood with the authorities, have you contacted political parties or
other political organisations?” 1 ¼ often/sometimes, 0 ¼ never (LAB 2005, p73std, see also
p73sta, p73stb, p73stc).
18. As Booth and Seligson (2010) see clientelistic tendencies mostly in the contacting of local
government officials or politicians, we test this single measure as an alternative, possibly
closer proxy of clientelism. Our results remain substantially unchanged and are reported in
Supplemental Table S7.
19. To control for differences in job market pressure, we factor in the wage premium as a measure of
the strength of different types of employees (Page´s and Stampini, 2009) in the sensitivity
analysis. We also add a control for the share of the employed population and to approximate
the degree of universal social policies we take the pension coverage rate (contributors as share of
the economically active population) from Rofman and Oliveri (2012). The estimation results for
these additional meso- and macro-level control variables are reported in supplementary material.
20. The rug illustrates the distribution of the LR indicator in our sample.
21. The correlation between JS and LR is rJS_LR¼0.373. This indicates that stronger individual
LRs are not necessarily combined with extensive collective LRs, but rather the opposite.
However, the low correlation might also be caused by differences in enforcement. Similar
things apply to measures of effective regulation (e.g. Ronconi, 2015).
22. Looking at the effect of individual job protection in a regression similar to M7 or M8, we find further
support for the above illustrated pattern. In Supplemental Table S8, we show more models with
the LS indicator. While we do find less evidence for the cross-level effects, we see that, controlling
for enforcement, the informals are more sceptic about the law in countries with high protection.
23. Another test for the LR indicator is excluding some outliers such as Bolivia and Uruguay (see
Figure 2). When we exclude Bolivia, the results are unaffected. When we exclude Uruguay
interaction effects between unemployed and informals with LR remain stable, whereas the
direct effect of labor laws as an aggregate effect becomes insignificant. Findings are reported
in Supplemental Table S6.
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Appendix 1
Table 1A. Descriptive Statistic.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DV
Labor law scepticism 17,956 3.01 0.77 1 4
Independent micro variables
Employment status
Self-employed 17,956 0.33 0.47 0 1
Public employee 17,956 0.08 0.27 0 1
Private employee 17,956 0.18 0.39 0 1
Unemployed 17,956 0.07 0.25 0 1
Retired 17,956 0.07 0.25 0 1
Housekeeping 17,956 0.21 0.40 0 1
Student 17,956 0.07 0.26 0 1
Informal worker 17,098 0.21 0.41 0 1
Controls
Level of education
Primary 17,956 0.48 0.50 0 1
Secondary 17,956 0.37 0.48 0 1
Tertiary 17,956 0.15 0.36 0 1
Male 17,956 0.50 0.50 0 1
Married 17,956 0.57 0.50 0 1
Wealth index 17,956 2.18 0.98 0.00 4.16
Urban 17,956 5.21 2.48 1 8
Household head 17,956 0.51 0.50 0 1
Union confidence 17,286 0.27 0.45 0 1
Unemployment risk 10,384 3.17 0.99 1 4
Politically active 17,490 0.72 1.16 0 4
Enforcement 17,956 5.13 2.36 1 10
Independent macro variables
Labor Rights Indicator 17,956 17.93 4.38 12.75 29.5
Job Security Indicator 17,102 3.10 0.72 1.79 4.76
Macro controls
Social security exp. 17,956 12.43 5.00 4.68 22.51
Source: LAB 2005; Mosley (2010), Heckman and Page´s (2000), and World Bank (WDI).
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